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Treaties and the Presumption against Preemption 
David H. Moore∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
When deciding whether a federal statute that regulates domestic 
issues preempts state law, “the Supreme Court presumes that 
Congress does not intend to displace the traditional regulatory 
authority of the States.”1 The question arises whether this same 
presumption applies when the federal law at issue is an Article II 
treaty. At this stage, the draft Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States replies that “[t]he case law does 
not clearly support any presumption regarding preemption of State 
law by a treaty.”2 This Article attempts to demonstrate that there is 
(or should be) more clarity in favor of a presumption against 
preemption in the treaty context than the draft Restatement (Fourth) 
suggests. Part I summarizes the nature of the presumption against 
preemption. Part II identifies which of the three types of treaty—
self-executing, executed, and non-self-executing—may effect 
 
∗ Associate Dean of Academic Affairs and Research and Wayne M. and Connie C. Hancock 
Professor of Law, Brigham Young University, J. Reuben Clark Law School. I wish to thank 
participants in the BYU Law Review Symposium on Treaty Law and the Restatement for helpful 
comments, and in particular Mike Ramsey, who also reviewed a prior draft of this Article. 
 1.  RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES: TREATIES § 108 reporters’ note 2 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2015). 
But cf. Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption Against Preemption 
in the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253, 278, 307–09, 331 (2011) (noting inconsistent 
invocation of the presumption against preemption); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 
225, 232 (2000) (arguing that a presumption against preemption is inconsistent with the 
original understanding of the Supremacy Clause). The Supreme Court has left unresolved 
whether the same presumption “appl[ies] to statutes that concern foreign affairs.” 
RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES: 
TREATIES § 108 reporters’ note 2 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2015). For an 
argument that it should not, see Jack L. Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, 
2000 SUP. CT. REV. 175, 181–87, 195–201. 
 2.  RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES: TREATIES § 108 reporter’s note 2 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2015); 
see also Michael P. Van Alstine, Federal Common Law in an Age of Treaties, 89 CORNELL L. 
REV. 892, 969 (2004) (discussing how the Supreme Court over time has invoked inconsistent 
“background assumptions about the preemptive force of treaties”). 
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preemption. For those treaties that may work preemption, Part III 
explores whether the presumption against preemption attaches. 
I. DEFINING THE PRESUMPTION 
To begin, it is important to understand the nature of the 
presumption against preemption.3 The reach of the presumption is 
not entirely clear. Sometimes the presumption is stated broadly: the 
presumption is said to apply generally, not just when the state law 
that might be preempted falls within an area of traditional state 
regulation.4 Thus, in Wyeth v. Levine, the Court asserted that  
[i]n all pre-emption cases, and particularly in those in which Congress 
has ‘legislated . . . in a field which the States have traditionally 
occupied,’ . . . we ‘start with the assumption that the historic police 
powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act 
unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’5  
The narrower version of the presumption focuses on the particular 
threat of displacing state authority in areas of traditional state 
regulation.6 The Supreme Court invoked this narrower version in 
Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner when it stated, “There is . . . a 
presumption against pre-emption in areas of traditional state 
regulation such as family law.”7 While some of the arguments in 
favor of the narrower version also support the broader version, the 
draft Restatement (Fourth) addresses the narrower version of the 
presumption.8 This Article follows suit. 
 
 3.  For a quick overview of the history of, and current debates regarding, the 
presumption against preemption, see Young, supra note 1, at 265–78, 307–10. 
 4.  Id. at 332–34. 
 5.  555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 
485 (1996)). 
 6.  It thus raises the challenges of identifying areas of traditional state regulation and of 
deciding the area in which a potentially preemptive federal law operates. See, e.g., Young, supra 
note 1, at 435–37. 
 7.  532 U.S. 141, 151 (2001). 
 8.  See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES: TREATIES § 108 reporter’s note 2 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2015) 
(“[T]he Supreme Court presumes that Congress does not intend to displace the traditional 
regulatory authority of the States” through “federal statutes that concern domestic matters.”). 
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II. WHEN TREATIES MAY PREEMPT 
One might read the draft Restatement (Fourth) as suggesting 
that even the narrower version of the presumption against 
preemption applies less frequently in the treaty context, with the 
result that treaties tend to preempt state law more readily than do 
statutes. While it may be true that certain types of treaties preempt 
more readily than statutes (an issue addressed infra), this is not true 
of all treaties. Treaties generally present in one of three forms:9 (1) 
non-self-executing treaty, (2) executed non-self-executing treaty, or 
(3) self-executing treaty.10 If any of these treaties lacks power to 
preempt state law, the presumption against preemption would not 
apply. Concluding that the presumption does not apply would not 
mean that treaties preempt more than statutes, but less. The 
presumption would not apply because the treaty could not effect 
preemption at all, rather than because the treaty could preempt 
unobstructed by the preemption. 
To understand the work of the presumption against preemption, 
then, we must ask the preliminary question whether treaties of each 
type may preempt state law. Self-executing treaties clearly may, as the 
draft Restatement (Fourth) recognizes.11 Asakura v. City of Seattle 
provides a familiar example.12 In Asakura, a local ordinance sought 
to prevent a Japanese subject from operating a pawnshop in Seattle 
notwithstanding a U.S.-Japan treaty of amity securing the rights of 
Japanese subjects to carry on business in the United States on the 
 
 9.  I classify treaties by wholes for simplicity’s sake. The reality is that self-execution 
and implementation are properly determined at the treaty obligation rather than entire treaty 
level. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 
111 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 1987). Different obligations within the same treaty may be non-
self-executing, non-self-executing but implemented, and self-executing. 
 10.  Although a self-executing treaty might be the subject of facilitating legislation—
legislation that, for example, “detail[s] specific legal procedures, burdens of proof, and 
remedies for courts applying” the treaty—the treaty itself would remain directly enforceable in 
U.S. courts and should be treated, for preemption purposes, like self-executing treaties that 
lack facilitating legislation. John F. Coyle, Incorporative Statutes and the Borrowed Treaty Rule, 
50 VA. J. INT’L L. 655, 666–67 (2010); see also id. nn.44–45. 
 11.  E.g., RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES: TREATIES (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2015) (“[W]hen there is a 
conflict between State or local law and a self-executing treaty provision, courts will apply the 
treaty provision.”). 
 12.  265 U.S. 332, 332 (1924). 
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same terms as U.S. citizens.13 Noting that the treaty was self-
executing—that is, “operate[d] of itself without the aid of any 
legislation”—the Court concluded that the offending ordinance 
was preempted.14 
Non-self-executing treaties that have been implemented by 
statute (i.e., executed treaties) may also effect preemption. Formally, 
it is the statute, not the treaty, that preempts, but preemption 
effectively enforces the treaty obligations against the preempted 
law.15 Missouri v. Holland provides an example of this scenario.16 The 
United States and Britain entered a treaty to regulate birds that 
migrated between the United States and Canada.17 The treaty 
provided that “[t]he High Contracting Powers agree themselves to 
take, or propose to their respective appropriate law-making bodies, 
the necessary measures for insuring the execution of the present 
Convention.”18 A treaty obligation to legislate (or here, to propose 
legislation) is likely to be classified by U.S. courts as non-self-
executing.19 Congress executed the treaty obligation by passing the 
Migratory Bird Treaty Act.20 Finding the treaty and statute 
constitutional, the Court permitted enforcement of the statute in the 
face of contrary state law.21 
 
 13.  See id. at 339–40. 
 14.  Id. at 341. 
 15.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 111 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (“[S]trictly, it is the implementing legislation, 
rather than the agreement itself, that is given effect as law in the United States.”). 
 16.  252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
 17.  Id. at 431. 
 18.  Convention between the United States and Great Britain for the Protection of 
Migratory Birds, (Aug. 16, 1916), 39 Stat. 1702; see also Holland, 252 U.S. at 431. 
 19.  See JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 73, 80 
(2d ed. 2003) (asserting “that all treaties are self-executing except those . . . which, by their 
terms considered in context, require domestic implementing legislation or seek to declare 
war”); RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES: 
TREATIES § 108 reporter’s note 2 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2015). But cf. 
Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 695, 
709–10 (1995) (reasoning that a treaty may overcome a presumption of self-execution if it 
“stipulate[s] for some future legislative act” while concluding that a treaty that requires only 
necessary legislation remains self-executing since the Supremacy Clause renders implementing 
legislation generally unnecessary in the United States). 
 20.  See Holland, 252 U.S. at 430–31. 
 21.  See id. at 435. 
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As these brief examples illustrate, the preemptive potential of 
self-executing and executed treaties is well-established. That is not 
the case when it comes to non-self-executing treaties. The 
Restatement (Third) speculated that non-self-executing treaties could 
preempt state law in certain circumstances. Such a treaty, the 
Restatement (Third) reasoned, might evidence a “federal policy 
superseding State law or policy.”22 Similarly, a non-self-executing 
treaty might “occupy a field” and thereby preempt even consistent 
state law, though that possibility “ha[d] apparently not been 
adjudicated.”23 The draft Restatement (Fourth) currently does not 
include this language, nor does it foreclose preemption by non-self-
executing treaty.24 
Yet recent developments suggest that non-self-executing treaties 
cannot, of themselves, effect preemption. In Medellín v. Texas, the 
Court faced a U.S. treaty obligation to “undertake[] to comply” 
with judgments of the International Court of Justice (ICJ).25 In 
response to a suit by Mexico, the ICJ had ordered the United States 
to review and reconsider the capital convictions and sentences of 
José Medellín and other Mexican nationals.26 Texas criminal 
procedure barred the review.27 Consequently, there was a direct 
 
 22.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 115 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1987); see also id. § 1 reporter’s note 5 (“Supremacy implies that 
State law and policy must bow . . . when inconsistent with federal law or policy . . . .”). 
 23.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 115 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1987); see also id. § 1 reporter’s note 5 (“There are no clear 
cases, but principle would support the view that the federal government can preempt and 
exclude the States [—that is, occupy the field—] not only by statute but by treaty or other 
international agreement, and even by executive acts that are within the President’s 
constitutional authority.”). 
 24.  The draft Restatement (Fourth) explains that self-executing treaties prevail over 
contrary state law, but does not expressly address the preemptive potential of non-self-
executing treaties. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES: TREATIES § 108 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2015); id. 
cmts. a–b; see id. reporters’ note 1 (observing that “[c]ourts have frequently found treaty 
provisions to supersede contrary State or local law, often without addressing the question 
of self-execution”). 
 25.  U.N. Charter art. 94, ¶ 1; see also Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 500 (2008). 
 26.  See Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 
I.C.J. 12, 72 (Mar. 31); see also Medellín, 552 U.S. at 502–03. 
 27.  See Medellín, 552 U.S. at 503–04. Medellín’s initial habeas petition was rejected for 
procedural default based on Medellín’s failure to raise his claims earlier; the habeas petition he 
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conflict between the United States’ treaty obligations and Texas 
law.28 It would be impossible for Texas courts to both engage in 
review and reconsideration and treat Medellín’s request as barred. 
The Court resolved this conflict in favor of state law because the 
treaty obligation to comply with ICJ judgments was non-self-
executing.29 A non-self-executing treaty obligation, at a minimum, is 
not enforceable by U.S. courts.30 Thus, the Court could not engage 
in the least aggressive form of implied preemption—conflict 
preemption—based on a non-self-executing treaty. 
This conclusion does not bode well for the Restatement (Third)’s 
suggestion that a non-self-executing treaty might work a more 
aggressive preemption, field preemption. Preemption is ultimately a 
question of intent.31 If the Court did not find an intent to preempt 
in the narrow space where the federal treaty and state law conflicted, 
it is hard to imagine a non-self-executing treaty demonstrating an 
intent to occupy a broader sphere. Indeed, congressional intent to 
occupy a field is often indicated by congressional establishment of a 
detailed regulatory and remedial scheme.32 Rather than manifest 
intent to fill a regulatory and remedial space, a non-self-executing 
treaty evidences a decision to forego remedies, at least in U.S. 
courts, until the enactment of implementing legislation. 
Intent to occupy a field may also arise from lawmaking in an area 
of dominant federal interest.33 In Medellín, there were compelling 
 
filed after the ICJ ruled in Mexico’s favor was barred by Texas law’s prohibition on successive 
petitions. See id. at 501–04. 
 28.  See Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1949–50 (2013) (explaining that “a 
[preemptive] conflict occurs when compliance with both federal and state 
regulations is impossible”). 
 29.  See Medellín, 552 U.S. at 504–06, 522–23. 
 30.  See, e.g., David H. Moore, Medellín, the Alien Tort Statute, and the Domestic Status 
of International Law, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 485, 491 n.46 (2010). 
 31.  See, e.g., Medtronics, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (repeating the 
established principle that “‘[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone’ in every pre-
emption case”) (quoting Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)). 
 32.  See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501 (2012) (“The intent 
to displace state law altogether can be inferred from a framework of regulation ‘so 
pervasive . . . that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it’ or where there 
is a ‘federal interest . . . so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude 
enforcement of state laws on the same subject.’”) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator 
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). 
 33.  See Hillman, 133 S. Ct. at 1949–50. 
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federal interests to support preemption of Texas law. It was 
undisputed, the Court acknowledged, “that the Avena decision—a 
decision that flows from the treaties through which the United 
States submitted to ICJ jurisdiction . . . constitutes 
an international law obligation on the part of the United States.”34 
Securing federal power to comply with national treaty commitments 
was one of the motivations behind creation and ratification of the 
Constitution itself and generated provisions such as the Supremacy 
Clause.35 Moreover, the Court recognized that in seeking to comply 
with the ICJ’s judgment,  
the President [sought] to vindicate United States interests in 
ensuring the reciprocal observance of the Vienna Convention, 
protecting relations with foreign governments, and demonstrating 
commitment to the role of international law. These interests [were] 
plainly compelling.36  
Yet none of these interests traversed the non-self-executing nature of 
the United States’ treaty commitments to preempt state law. 
Medellín thus undercuts the Restatement (Third)’s speculation that 
non-self-executing treaties may produce field preemption. 
Medellín likewise suggests that federal policies reflected in non-
self-executing treaties will not be given preemptive effect. The 
notion that federal foreign affairs policies may preempt state law 
draws support from American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi.37 In 
that case, the United States and Germany, as well as other countries, 
had entered executive agreements to resolve the problem of unpaid 
Holocaust-era insurance claims.38 In its own effort to facilitate the 
resolution of those claims, California enacted legislation requiring 
insurance companies to divulge information about Holocaust-era 
policies.39 The federal executive complained that California’s 
 
 34.  Medellín, 552 U.S. at 504 (emphasis in original). 
 35.  See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. VI; RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES: TREATIES § 108 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary 
Draft No. 4, 2015) (“Ensuring the capacity of treaty obligations to supplant inconsistent state 
laws, particularly in state courts, was a central objective of the Supremacy Clause.”). 
 36.  Medellín, 552 U.S. at 524; see also id. at 511 (acknowledging that compliance with 
ICJ judgments involves “sensitive foreign policy decisions”). 
 37.  539 U.S. 396 (2003). 
 38.  See id. at 405–08. 
 39.  See id. at 408–10. 
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legislation interfered with the federal response to the issue.40 
Although the executive agreements did not expressly displace the 
California law, the Court found the law preempted by “the foreign 
policy those agreements embody.”41 
Medellín reached the opposite conclusion when the potentially 
preemptive federal policy derived from non-self-executing treaties. 
The treaties at issue in Medellín could easily be said to reflect a 
federal policy of compliance with ICJ judgments. By ratifying the 
Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 
the United States agreed to submit itself to ICJ jurisdiction in suits 
like Avena.42 Pursuant to the UN Charter, the United States 
“undert[ook] to comply” with the judgment issued in those suits.43 
The United States itself argued that these treaties “create[d] an 
obligation to comply.”44 Moreover, while the U.S. withdrew from 
future ICJ jurisdiction in cases like Avena, the President specifically 
resolved to comply with the Avena judgment by having state courts 
review and reconsider the convictions and sentences of Medellín and 
other Mexican nationals.45 Accordingly, the executive urged 
preemption of the obstructing Texas law.46 Notwithstanding the 
policy of compliance arguably reflected in the treaties and expressed 
by the President before and during the litigation, the Court upheld 
Texas law. The Court seemed to reason that a non-self-executing 
treaty reflects an understanding by the treatymakers that preemption 
will generally derive from future legislation rather than the treaty or 
executive policy.47 Requiring the preemption decision to be made 
through the legislative process would ensure that a single federal 
 
 40.  See id. at 411. 
 41.  Id. at 417; see id. at 413, 420–27. 
 42.  See Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes to the 
Vienna Convention, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 325; Medellín, 552 U.S. at 499. 
 43.  U.N. Charter art. 94(1); Medellín, 552 U.S. at 500. 
 44.  Medellín, 552 U.S. at 525 (quoting Brief for United States of America as Amicus 
Curiae at 11). At the same time, the United States retained authority to veto any efforts to 
enforce ICJ judgments at the Security Council. See Medellín, 552 U.S. at 509–11. This fact cut 
against classifying the obligation to comply as self-executing, but does not preclude a general 
policy of compliance. See id.  
 45.  See Medellín, 552 U.S. at 503. 
 46.  See, e.g., id. at 523. 
 47.  See id. at 525–30. 
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actor could not preempt state law.48 Consistent with this reasoning, 
the Court concluded that the President “may not rely upon a non-
self-executing treaty to ‘establish binding rules of decision that 
preempt contrary state law.’”49 
The conclusion that the President could not derive authority 
from a non-self-executing treaty to preempt state law does not 
preclude preemption by the President in all circumstances. Both 
majority and dissent recognized that it would be “difficult to believe 
that in the exercise of his Article II powers pursuant to a ratified 
treaty, the President can never take action that would result in setting 
aside state law.”50 Yet the Court seems to have left little room for this 
possibility. The Court applied Justice Jackson’s tripartite framework 
to assess the President’s authority to execute a non-self-executing 
treaty, concluding that a non-self-executing treaty places the 
President in category three where he can only prevail if the power he 
exercises is exclusive to the presidency.51 Such exclusive powers are 
limited. They include a (recently endorsed) power to recognize 
foreign states and governments.52 The President might also execute a 
treaty when authorized by statute (at least if the statute is enacted 
after the treaty).53 The practical result is that non-self-executing 
treaties are likely to give rise to state preemption by presidential 
action in relatively few, if any, situations. Moreover, the preemption 
would be effected by the President’s independently authorized 
implementing action, not the treaty itself, placing these treaties in a 
similar category to treaties implemented by statute. The President’s 
limited ability to preempt state law in conjunction with a non-self-
 
 48.  See id. at 526–30. The requirement of legislative implementation places the 
preemption decision in the hands of Congress and the President rather than the courts. These 
lawmakers (President and Congress) include the treatymakers (President and Senate) and are 
therefore in a better position than the courts to assess whether state laws impede the treaty’s 
purposes and ought to be preempted. 
 49.  Id. at 530 (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 5). The Court did 
recognize that the President could “comply with [non-self-executing] treaty[] obligations by 
some . . . means [other than converting them into judicially enforceable and preemptive law], 
so long as [those means] are consistent with the Constitution.” Medellín, 552 U.S. at 530. 
 50.  Id. at 523 n.13 (quoting dissent of Breyer, J., at 564). 
 51.  See id. at 524–25, 527; Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 
637–38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 52.  See Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 132 S. Ct. 2076, 2096 (2015). 
 53.  Cf. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 529–30 (searching for statutes reflecting congressional 
acquiescence in the President’s attempted execution of the ICJ judgment). 
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executing treaty only confirms the conclusion that such treaties 
cannot effect preemption on their own. 
If all this were not enough to conclude that Medellín forecloses 
preemption by non-self-executing treaty, the Medellín Court raised 
the possibility that a non-self-executing treaty may not even qualify 
as domestic law.54 Such an understanding of non-self-execution 
would provide additional reason not to give the treaty preemptive 
effect. It would be hard to argue, for example, that the federal 
government sought to occupy a legal field or to adopt a preemptive 
policy by ratifying a treaty on the understanding that the treaty’s 
terms would not even enter domestic law. 
The result is that a non-self-executing treaty, without more, does 
not present the issue of preemption to the courts.55 The presumption 
against preemption is not relevant, not because the presumption 
does not apply to treaties, but because non-self-executing treaties do 
not present the possibility of preemption. Medellín endorsed a broad 
scope for non-self-execution, thus reducing the number of treaties 
that might effect preemption of state law.56 
III. WHEN THE PRESUMPTION ATTACHES 
For those treaties that are self-executing post-Medellín, or that 
are executed, the question arises whether the presumption against 
preemption attaches. As the draft Restatement (Fourth) notes, the 
Supreme Court has been inconsistent on this question, often 
preempting state law in the face of conflicting treaties but 
 
 54.  See, e.g., Moore, supra note 30, at 491 n.46 (discussing how Medellín generated 
uncertainty over the meaning of non-self-execution). But cf. Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 
2077, 2084 (2014) (suggesting that a non-self-executing treaty is domestic law that is not 
judicially enforceable until executed by Congress); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 
735 (2004) (indicating that a non-self-executing treaty does “not itself create obligations 
enforceable in the federal courts”). 
 55.  Similarly, the draft Restatement (Fourth) concludes that “[o]nly self-executing 
treaty provisions can be applied by the judiciary to override a federal statute, since non-self-
executing treaty provisions are not directly enforceable in U.S. courts.” RESTATEMENT 
(FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES: TREATIES § 109 
reporters’ note 3 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2015). 
 56.   See, e.g., Moore, supra note 30, at 490–91. 
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occasionally endorsing a presumption against preemption.57 The 
Court’s most recent case touching on the question suggests that the 
presumption attaches to treaties that have been statutorily executed. 
There are good reasons to apply the presumption to self-executing 
treaties as well. 
A. Executed Treaties 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bond v. United States58 
suggests that the presumption against preemption applies to non-
self-executing treaties that have been executed by statute. That is, 
the presumption applies even when the statute in question is a 
statute implementing a treaty.59 The treaty at issue in Bond—the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, 
Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their 
Destruction60—was non-self-executing.61 It required “[e]ach State 
Party . . . in accordance with its constitutional processes, [to] adopt 
the necessary measures to implement its [Convention] obligations,” 
including by criminalizing actions that State Parties were prohibited 
from taking.62 Congress executed the treaty by enacting the 
Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act, under which 
petitioner Carol Bond was prosecuted.63 The Court turned first to 
the treaty to understand the reach of the Act.64 The Court was 
understandably skeptical that the treaty was meant to address Bond’s 
relatively minor use of chemicals against her former friend.65 
Nonetheless, “[e]ven if the treaty [did] reach that far,” Congress 
 
 57.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES: TREATIES § 108 reporters’ note 2 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft 
No. 4, 2015). 
 58. 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014). 
 59.  See William S. Dodge, Bond v. United States and Congress’s Role in Implementing 
Treaties, AJIL UNBOUND (June 4, 2014, 10:26 AM), http://www.asil.org/blogs/bond-v-
united-states-and-congress%E2%80%99s-role-implementing-treaties (“The central holding of 
Bond is that statutes implementing treaties are not exceptions to the rules of statutory 
interpretation that the Supreme Court has developed to protect federalism.”). 
 60.  1974 U.N.T.S. 317, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-21. 
 61.  Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2084 (2014). 
 62.  Id. (quoting Convention, Art. VII(1), 1974 U.N.T.S. 331). 
 63.  Id. at 2085. 
 64.  Id. at 2087. 
 65.  See id. 
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could “observ[e] the Constitution’s division of responsibility 
between [the federal and State] sovereigns,” leaving matters of 
traditional state regulation, such as “local crimes[,] to the States.”66 
In other words, even if a non-self-executing treaty does not respect 
the federalist division of power and attempts to reach areas of 
traditional state regulation, Congress will be presumed 
to have implemented in a narrower fashion, consistent with 
federalism restraints.67 
The federalist presumption Bond applied was not the 
presumption against preemption. Bond was not asking whether the 
Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act preempted state 
law. Rather, Bond asked whether that Act meant to reach an area of 
traditional state regulation—the regulation of local crime. As a 
result, the Court applied the “[c]losely related” canon that the 
federal government must be reasonably explicit if it wishes to alter 
the federal-state balance of power.68 
Notwithstanding this difference, there is reason to believe post-
Bond that the Court would apply the presumption against 
preemption to implementing statutes. First, the rationale behind 
both presumptions is the same: maintenance of the federalist 
allocation of power in the absence of federal decision to alter it.69 
Second, the presumption applied in Bond protected against 
comparatively minor intrusion on state authority. It protected against 
the extension of federal law into an area of traditional state 
regulation in a way that would arguably have complemented state 
law. Even if the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act 
reached Bond’s crime, state law would continue to do so as well. If 
federalism necessarily constrained, by presumption, the reach of a 
complementary federal law implementing a treaty, it would 
presumably constrain the more intrusive reach of a preemptive 
implementing act. 
Indeed, the facts in Bond might be perceived as presenting a 
preemption scenario, providing additional support for application of 
 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  But cf. id. at 2090 (noting that consideration of federalism principles is appropriate 
in interpreting an ambiguous implementing statute while suggesting that the purpose of the 
treaty implemented may remove statutory ambiguity). 
 68.  Id. at 2089. 
 69.  See, e.g., id. at 2088–90. 
4.MOORE.AA (DO NOT DELETE) 4/30/2016  6:02 PM 
1555 Treaties and the Presumption against Preemption 
  
1567 
a presumption against preemption to implementing legislation. The 
federal implementing act in Bond would displace (albeit through 
prosecutorial discretion) the lesser penalties state law elected for the 
sort of behavior in which Bond engaged. The Court protected state 
authority in this scenario by presumption and presumably would do 
so in more direct preemption cases as well. 
There are two significant counterpoints to this conclusion. First, 
Bond’s focus on the reach of the implementing statute resulted from 
a desire to avoid reaching broader questions about the limits of the 
federal government’s treaty and necessary and proper powers.70 
While three Justices addressed these broader questions,71 the 
majority avoided them by construing the implementing legislation to 
not reach Bond’s conduct.72 Second, Bond is only one case—albeit 
the most recent one—in which the Court has touched on the 
appropriateness of a presumption against preemption in the treaty 
context. As noted, the Court has generally preempted state law 
without reference to the presumption. The Court has also expressed 
doubt about whether the presumption against preemption applies to 
statutes bearing on foreign affairs.73 
If Bond itself does not erase that doubt going forward, the doubt 
has sufficient outlet in the presumption against preemption. As 
noted, the narrower version of the presumption is tied to whether 
the state law that is at risk of preemption resides in an area of 
traditional state regulation. A general concern that state law should 
not occupy certain areas—such as human rights policy toward 
Burma—can find full expression in the presumption. At the same 
time, it is important that the presumption’s applicability turn on 
 
 70.  See id. at 2087 (citing the canon of constitutional avoidance to support focusing on 
the argument that the implementing statute “does not cover [Bond’s] conduct”). 
 71.  See, e.g., id. at 2098–2102 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (concluding that 
Congress has power to do what is necessary and proper to facilitate the making of treaties, but 
must rely on its enumerated powers to implement treaties); id. at 2103–10 (Thomas, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (concluding that the treaty power extends only to “matters of 
international intercourse and [not to] matters of purely domestic regulation”); id. at 2111 
(Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (agreeing with Justice Thomas “that the treaty power is 
limited to agreements that address matters of legitimate international concern”). 
 72.  See id. at 2093 (majority opinion). 
 73.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES: TREATIES § 108 reporters’ note 2 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft 
No. 4, 2015). 
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whether the state law rests in an issue of traditional state responsibility 
rather than on whether the state law bears on foreign affairs. The 
realm of foreign affairs has expanded significantly since the treaty 
power was delegated to the federal government. One need not try to 
dial back to an originalist understanding of the scope of foreign affairs 
to protect state interests from unintentional displacement through a 
presumption focused on states’ traditional realm. 
A final observation supports application of the presumption to 
treaties executed by statute. Non-self-executing treaties may be 
implemented “through preexisting law.”74 Prior to negotiation of the 
treaty, these “implementing” statutes would be subject to the 
presumption against preemption to the same extent as other statutes 
that exist independent of treaties. There is little reason to believe 
that this result would change when the statutes became linked to a 
non-self-executing treaty.75 At least this subset of statutes, then, 
would be governed by the presumption against preemption. 
B. Self-Executing Treaties 
This takes us to self-executing treaties. One unfamiliar with the 
substantive scope of treaties might be forgiven for wondering whether 
the presumption by its own terms would reach self-executing treaties. 
As noted, the presumption in its narrow version applies only when the 
state law to be preempted sits in an area of traditional state 
regulation.76 Treaties inevitably extend beyond the domestic as they 
involve commitments to, and/or by, at least one foreign state or 
entity. Nonetheless, treaties have addressed matters of traditional state 
regulation since before the Founding.77 Globalization and the 
expansion of international law have only increased the probability that 
 
 74.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 111 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (“There can, of course, be instances in which the 
United States Constitution, or previously enacted legislation, will be fully adequate to give 
effect to an apparently non-self-executing international agreement, thus obviating the need of 
adopting new legislation to implement it.”). 
 75.  If this conclusion is correct, it also undercuts the argument that the existence of an 
international obligation precludes application of the presumption against preemption. See infra 
paragraph accompanying note 94. 
 76.  See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 77.  See, e.g., Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (1 Dall.) 199, 220–21, 229, 241 (1796) 
(concluding that the U.S.-Britain Treaty of Peace preempted a Virginia law that addressed the 
obligations of debtors, a matter that fell within state power). 
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treaties will address matters of traditional state regulation.78 Like 
statutes, then, treaties address subjects of traditional state authority, 
and do so with increasing frequency. 
As noted above, self-executing treaties also effect preemption. 
The question is whether treaties should effect preemption more 
readily than statutes. The source of treaties’ and statutes’ preemptive 
power is the same—the Supremacy Clause.79 That Clause does not 
suggest that either treaties or statutes should have greater preemptive 
effect than the other. It simply declares that statutes passed pursuant 
to the Constitution and treaties made before or after ratification of 
the Constitution “shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the 
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.”80  Consistent with this text, the Supreme Court 
recognized in Foster v. Nielson that although “[a] treaty is in its nature 
a contract between two nations, not a legislative act,” “[i]n the United 
States a different principle is established.”81  A treaty “is . . . to be 
regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, 
whenever it” is self-executing.82 The fact that statutes and self-
executing treaties share the same preemptive power and present the 
same threat to traditional state authority suggest that they should be 
equally subject to the presumption against preemption. 
To apply the presumption differently to statutes and treaties 
would require finding that the treaty power or its product is 
meaningfully different than the legislative power or its product.83 No 
relevant differences appear. 
 
 78.  See, e.g., Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2099–2100 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(noting the expansion of topics addressed by treaties, especially multilateral treaties, since 
World War II); id. at 2110 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting the Restatement 
of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States’ abandonment of a subject matter limitation 
on the treaty power between the second and third editions). 
 79.  See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2. Pet.) 253, 314 (1829). 
 82.  Id. This equivalence is also reflected in the last-in-time rule under which a statute 
or self-executing treaty trumps a prior inconsistent treaty or statute as a matter of domestic law. 
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115 
(1-2) cmts. a–c, reporters’ note 1–2 (AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
 83.  Cf. Van Alstine, supra note 2, at 971–78 (arguing against applying the 
presumption against preemption to self-executing treaties given the unique nature of 
treaties and the treaty power). 
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1. Treaty Power 
Some would argue that the treaty and legislative powers are 
distinguishable because the federal power to make treaties is 
exclusive, while Congress’s power to legislate is generally concurrent. 
Michael Van Alstine, for example, argues that “treaties by their 
nature represent a formal exercise of the federal government’s 
exclusive authority over the creation of international obligations of 
the United States. This fundamental difference with the shared 
legislative powers of Article I substantially undermines the traditional 
presumption against preemption . . . in the treaty context.”84 
The difference between the treaty and legislative powers 
ultimately does not support differential application of the 
presumption against preemption, however. The treatymakers are as 
bound by the Constitution as are federal legislators and the 
presumption derives from the Constitution. More particularly, it 
derives, not from the nature of any one enumerated power, but from 
the Constitution’s federalist structure.85 Even Missouri v. Holland 
recognized that that structure applies to the treaty power.86 
Moreover, the legislative power and the treaty power are similar 
in important respects. Both partake of a two-fold nature. In one 
sense, the legislative and treaty powers are procedural. They are 
vehicles for exercising lawmaking and other governmental powers. In 
another sense, they are substantive. They may address a range of 
substantive issues. Treatymaking as a device is denied to the states.87 
However, the delegation of the treaty procedure to the federal 
government did not itself displace state substantive authority in areas 
of traditional state regulation. To conclude otherwise would be to 
suggest that upon delegation of the treaty power, the states were 
divested of authority to address any issue that might be addressed by 
a treaty. No one goes that far. And if it is true that the federal treaty 
 
 84.  Van Alstine, supra note 2, at 899. 
 85.  See Bond, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2089, 2091 (majority) (noting that the “[c]losely 
related” “assumption that Congress normally preserves ‘the constitutional balance between the 
National Government and the States’ . . . is grounded in the very structure of the 
Constitution”) (quoting Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2001)). 
 86.  Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434–35 (1920) (assessing whether the 
treaty in question was “forbidden by some invisible radiation from the general terms of 
the Tenth Amendment”). 
 87.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
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power alone does not displace all traditional state authority that 
might be displaced by an actual treaty, then the rationale behind the 
presumption applies. The presumption rests on the rationale that 
even where the federal government has the power to address issues 
of traditional state regulation, state power should not be displaced 
without clear federal intent to do so. That is, the presumption turns 
on the substantive power of the states, not the vehicles retained by 
the states to exercise that power. The logic of the presumption thus 
supports its application to both statutes and their domestic law 
equivalent, self-executing treaties. 
The fact that the treaty power might be broader, as a 
substantive matter, than the legislative power granted to Congress 
does not alter this conclusion. When Congress enacts a statute it 
invariably exercises only some of the legislative power it possesses. 
Congress’s additional legislative power remains dormant as to the 
specific piece of legislation. The fact that Congress has been given 
additional legislative power does not mean that the enacted statute 
produces a broader preemptive effect than compelled by the 
enacted legislation. Similarly, the fact that the federal government 
may have a subject-matter-unlimited treaty power does not mean 
that the treaty actually approved should have broader preemptive 
effect than the treatymakers intended. Indeed, the fact that the 
federal government possesses unexercised treaty or legislative power 
after having enacted a statute or entered a treaty suggests that a 
presumption against preemption ought to apply. Such a 
presumption ensures that preemption only follows from federal 
navigation of the state-protective procedures required to exercise 
the statute and treatymaking powers rather than from an 
unintended dormant preemption.88 
 
 88.  See Michael D. Ramsey, Congress’s Limited Power to Enforce Treaties, 90 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1539, 1551 (2015) (arguing that “ambiguous treaty provisions should be 
construed not to invade traditional powers of the states” to ensure that such invasions only 
occur with supermajority Senate approval); Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2089 (explaining that “when 
legislation ‘affect[s] the federal balance, the requirement of clear statement assures that the 
legislature has in fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the critical matters involved in 
the judicial decision’”) (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 344 (1971)); Curtis A. 
Bradley, Bond, Clear Statement Requirements, and Political Process, AJIL UNBOUND (Jun. 3, 
2014), https://www.asil.org/blogs/bond-clear-statement-requirements-and-political-process 
(“[R]equiring that Congress expressly consider whether to intrude on state authority, rather 
than having the courts infer such intrusions, helps ensure that advocates of state authority will 
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 It also ensures that the treaty power does not become a one-
way ratchet to erode state authority.89 Delegation of treatymaking 
power to the national government was intended to check the states 
from acting contrary to treaty commitments, not to eliminate the 
states.90 The treatymakers have exercised the treaty power in ways 
consistent with that understanding. They have routinely respected 
federalist values in treatymaking.91 Federalism restraints on the 
treaty power do not solely serve state interests, however. As the 
Court repeated in Bond, the division of authority between the 
federal and state governments protects individual liberty.92 
Treatymakers should be presumed not to have intended to erode 
those liberty protections unless they do so clearly and, therefore, 
accountably. Finally, the presumption against preemption serves to 
moderate the debate over the scope of the treaty power.93 It need 
not foreclose the conclusion that the treaty power is subject-
matter-unlimited even as it protects state interests against 
unintended preemption pursuant to that power. 
 
be able to express their opposition adequately during the legislative process.”); Dodge, 
supra note 61 (noting that “the [Bond] Court’s approach has the salutary effect of 
protecting the political process or, as the Court put it in Bond, assuring ‘that the legislature 
has in fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the critical matters involved’”) (quoting 
Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2089). 
 89.  Cf. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2103 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(expressing doubt that the treaty power is a vehicle for establishing a federal police power 
over domestic affairs). 
 90.  See, e.g., MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
39–40 (2007). 
 91.  See, e.g., Duncan B. Hollis, Executive Federalism: Forging New Federalist 
Constraints on the Treaty Power, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1327, 1369–86 (2006) (discussing five 
ways in which the executive has accommodated federalism in treatymaking: “rejecting the 
treaty, . . . modifying the treaty, . . . modifying U.S. consent to the treaty, . . . limiting federal 
implementation of the treaty, and . . . limiting federal enforcement of the treaty”). 
 92.  See Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2091; id. at 2101 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); 
id. at 2103 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 93.  For a sense of the debate regarding the scope of the treaty power, compare Curtis 
A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390 (1998), and 
Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, Part II, 99 MICH. L. REV. 98 
(2000), with David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of 
the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075 (2000), and Edward T. 
Swaine, Does Federalism Constrain the Treaty Power?, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 403 (2003). 
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2. Treaty Product 
As with differences between the treaty and legislative powers, 
differences in the products of those powers—treaties and statutes—
fail to justify differential application of the presumption against 
preemption. The treaty power produces a product—the treaty—that 
differs from a statute in that the treaty involves an international law 
commitment to at least one other country or international entity. 
Care must be taken not to overstate the difference, however, because 
the process for creating statutes is widely employed to enter 
international agreements and because statutes can affect foreign 
affairs just as treaties can.94 But perhaps the fact that treaties embrace 
an international obligation should lead to greater enforcement of 
treaties against the states.95 Tellingly, the treaty’s international role 
has not produced this result in the self-execution context. As noted, 
in Medellín the Court adopted a broad notion of non-self-execution, 
leading to less judicial enforcement of treaties than statutes, 
notwithstanding treaties’ dual nature.96 The decision suggests that 
the dual nature of treaties does not require that treaties receive 
greater application than statutes. 
One might argue that because non-self-execution already reduces 
treaty enforcement, there is no need for an additional presumption 
against preemption. Yet the two doctrines serve different primary 
functions. Non-self-execution primarily plays a horizontal role, 
influencing whether treaties’ domestic impact will be decided by the 
courts or Congress following ratification.97 The presumption against 
preemption, by contrast, primarily addresses the vertical distribution 
of authority between the federal government and the states, 
protecting states against unintentional displacement in areas of 
traditional state power. 
 
 94.  See, e.g., David H. Moore, Do U.S. Courts Discriminate Against Treaties?: 
Equivalence, Duality, and Non-Self-Execution, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 2228, 2250–53 (2010). 
 95.  See Van Alstine, supra note 2, at 971–73. 
 96.  See supra text accompanying note 56. 
 97.  Indeed, in a forthcoming book, David Sloss argues that the notion that a non-self-
executing treaty does not preempt state law is a post-World War II departure from the 
traditional understanding of the Supremacy Clause. See DAVID SLOSS, INVISIBLE 
CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION: THE SILENT DEATH OF THE CONSTITUTION’S TREATY 
SUPREMACY RULE (forthcoming) (copy on file with author). 
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This vertical role has become more relevant as treaties address an 
expanding range of subject matters. In this sense, application of the 
presumption against preemption to self-executing treaties parallels 
application of the presumption to statutes. The expansion of the 
federal government’s legislative power, largely through the 
Commerce Clause, generated a need for the presumption against 
preemption as a means of protecting against the concentration of 
power.98 So, too, in the treaty context, the use of treaties to address a 
widening range of issues generates greater demand for the 
presumption against preemption. 
Trends in related areas support this conclusion. Even as 
international law and foreign affairs have expanded into areas of 
traditional state concern, the Supreme Court has shown greater 
solicitude for state sovereignty in the field of dormant preemption.99 
Although the Court had previously engaged in dormant foreign 
commerce preemption,100 in Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax 
Board of California the Court refused to preempt California’s 
approach to the taxation of multilateral corporations, leaving it to 
Congress to decide whether the California law should be tolerated.101 
Even more pertinent, in American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi, 
the Court suggested that dormant foreign affairs preemption (à la 
Zschernig102) might only be appropriate when a state acts outside an 
area of traditional state regulation.103  
Where, however, a State has acted within . . . its ‘traditional 
competence,’ but in a way that affects foreign relations, it might 
make good sense to require a conflict, of a clarity or substantiality 
 
 98.  See Young, supra note 1, at 267–68, 320–21. 
 99.  See, e.g., David H. Moore, Beyond One Voice, 98 MINN. L. REV. 953, 1012–13 & 
n.301 (2014) (discussing the trend toward greater respect for state sovereignty in preemption 
cases as well as hiccups in that trend). 
 100.  See, e.g., Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 453–54 
(1979) (sustaining, on dormant foreign commerce grounds, an as applied challenge to a 
California tax). 
 101.  See 512 U.S. 298, 327–38 (1994). 
 102.  See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968) (engaging in dormant foreign 
affairs preemption of an Oregon inheritance statute). 
 103.  See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 419–20 & n.11 (2003). 
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that would vary with the strength or the traditional importance of 
the state concern asserted.104  
In raising this proposition, the Court cited the same case it did in 
Bond for the presumption against preemption: Rice v. Santa Fe 
Elevator Corporation.105 The trend toward sensitivity to traditional 
state authority in the dormant context strengthens the case for that 
same sensitivity in the treaty preemption context. 
Bond both supports this conclusion and casts some doubt on it, 
but that doubt is not unavoidable. Bond stated in dictum that the 
federalism canon for interpreting the reach of implementing statutes 
does not apply to treaties. That is, implementing statutes, unlike 
treaties, “must be read consistent with principles of federalism 
inherent in our constitutional structure.”106 Yet it appears this 
 
 104.  Id. at 419 n.11; see also id. at 420 (suggesting that from the conflict preemption 
perspective, “it would be reasonable to consider the strength of the state interest, judged by 
standards of traditional practice, when deciding how serious a conflict must be shown before 
declaring the state law preempted”). Not only has the Court been more sensitive to the states 
in dormant preemption, but it has recently recognized boundaries on executive preemption of 
state law as well. See supra text accompanying notes 45–53. 
 105.  331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); see Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2088–89; Garamendi, 539 U.S. 
at 419 n.11. 
 106.  Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2088. The Court made a similar statement a few months earlier 
in Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 134 S. Ct. 1224 (2014). Lozano concerned the Hague 
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction and its implementing 
statute. See id. at 1228–29. The Convention generally mandates the return of an abducted 
child if the “petition for return [is filed] within one year after the child’s wrongful removal.” 
Id. at 1229. The Court addressed whether this “1-year period is subject to equitable tolling,” 
as federal statutes of limitations are presumed to be. Id. at 1231; see id. at 1231–32. In the 
course of concluding that equitable tolling did not apply, the Court stated that “[e]ven if a 
background principle is relevant to the interpretation of federal statutes, it has no proper role 
in the interpretation of treaties unless that principle is shared by the parties to ‘an agreement 
among sovereign powers.’” Id. at 1233 (quoting Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 
217, 226 (1996)). This statement does not bear on the presumption against preemption, 
however. The presumption against preemption addresses how a treaty obligation will be 
implemented domestically. Unless the states parties address that question, it is governed by the 
U.S. treatymakers’ intent. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF 
THE UNITED STATES § 111 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (“In the absence of special 
agreement, it is ordinarily for the United States to decide how it will carry out its international 
obligations.”). The Court rejected the use of domestic background principles to resolve 
questions of the states parties’ intent. See Lozano, 134 S. Ct. at 1232–33 (emphasizing that the 
parties’ intent governs the interpretation of treaty obligations). The states that enter a treaty 
cannot be assumed to act against the same legal backdrop that applies to domestic lawmaking. 
Thus, for example, Congress “legislate[s] against a background of common law adjudicatory 
principles,” including the principle of equitable tolling, in a way that states parties negotiating 
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statement was informed by the dual international and domestic 
nature of treaties. Treaties create obligations under international law 
and, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, may also be judicially 
enforceable domestic law.107 Unless the parties to a treaty addressed 
the question of preemption, the issue of preemption would not arise 
in interpreting the international obligations imposed by the treaty. 
Consequently, the presumption against preemption would not be 
relevant in ascertaining the international meaning of the treaty. The 
presumption would, however, remain relevant in understanding how 
the treaty would be enforced as a matter of domestic law. This 
interpretation of the Court’s dictum is consistent with the fact that 
the Chemical Weapons Convention was non-self-executing and 
therefore would have primarily had an international law effect absent 
implementation by Congress. It would not have been subject to 
judicial enforcement as domestic law. 
The draft Restatement (Fourth) pursues treaty interpretation 
concerns further in noting that “[a] presumption against preemption 
of State law could create an interpretation of the treaty that is 
different from the one shared by other parties to the treaty.”108 U.S. 
treaty jurisprudence already assumes this risk in departing from the 
interpretive rules of international law109 by, inter alia, endorsing 
 
treaties naturally do not. Id. at 1232 (quoting Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n. v. Solimino, 
501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991)). The Court’s statement in Lozano was thus correct, but should not 
be taken out of context to reach background principles, like the presumption against 
preemption, that attach to domestic questions of U.S. treatymaker intent. 
 107.  See, e.g., Hollis, supra note 91, at 1327–28 (discussing treaties’ “double life”). 
 108.  RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES: TREATIES § 108 reporters’ note 2 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2015). 
 109.  Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties detail the 
international law of treaty interpretation. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31–
32, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. The United States has not ratified 
the Vienna Convention, but has stated that many of its provisions, including Articles 31 and 
32, reflect customary international law that binds the United States. See, e.g., Obligations of 
Signatories Prior to Ratification, 2001 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, ch. 4, § B(1) at 212 (noting that “the United States regards [the 
Vienna Convention] as the authoritative guide to current treaty law and practice”); Conclusion 
and Entry into Force, 1979 DIGEST OF THE UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW at 692 (quoting the U.S. Ambassador to the Law of the Sea Convention as stating that 
“[t]he Vienna Convention provisions . . . are for the most part codifications of customary 
international law”). Jean Galbraith argues that the international and U.S. approaches to treaty 
interpretation have converged since the Restatement (Third), but partly because international 
practice has embraced a wider range of interpretive approaches than Article 31 and 32 
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more immediate recourse to negotiation history and giving weight 
to the executive’s interpretation of a treaty.110 Further, while it is 
perhaps not as rare for states parties to consider federalist hurdles to 
treaty obligations than to consider the question of self-execution, 
still it seems that states parties will generally not consider, let alone 
reach, an understanding on the preemptive force of treaties.111 To the 
extent they invest negotiating time and energy into reaching such an 
understanding, it presumably will be reflected in the treaty such that 
the presumption will be overcome. If any shared interpretation is 
ambiguous, the presumption secures a significant benefit—checking 
centralization of power—at a small cost to the treatymakers—the 
burden of being clearer. 
On a related note, the Draft posits that a presumption against 
preemption may “make it difficult for the United States to secure 
domestic compliance with a treaty, which can create foreign-relations 
difficulties for the United States.”112 The Restatement (Third) made 
this same argument in supporting a presumption in favor of self-
execution.113 That argument did not outweigh structural 
constitutional concerns in Medellín. Moreover, the treatymakers 
themselves apparently see certain foreign relations costs as 
worthwhile when they reject or negotiate alterations in treaties or 
attach reservations, understandings, or declarations to U.S. treaty 
ratification to accommodate federalism concerns.114 Further, to the 
extent there is anything to the argument that foreign states can 
 
originally suggested. See Jean Galbraith, What Should RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) Say About 
Treaty Interpretation?, 2015 BYU L. REV. 1499, 1511–18 (2016). Even if there has been 
convergence, differences remain. 
 110.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 325 cmt. g., reporters’ notes 1, 4, 5; § 326(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
 111.  The treaty in Bond, for example, was “agnostic between enforcement at the state 
versus federal level.” Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2087. See generally Hollis, supra note 91, at 1374–78 
(discussing ways in which the executive has sought to alter the text or understanding of treaties 
during negotiation to avoid federalism problems). 
 112. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES: TREATIES § 108 reporters’ note 2 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2015). 
 113.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 111 reporters’ note 5 (AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
 114.  See Hollis, supra note 91, at 1372–81 (discussing U.S. rejection, alteration, and 
ratification of treaties in ways sensitive to federalism interests). 
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target offending states rather than the nation as a whole, the 
argument would have traction here as well.115 
Finally, the Draft suggests that applying the presumption may be 
unnecessary because the Article II treatymaking process “was 
designed to protect State interests” and in fact does so, as reflected 
in the federalism interests that make it into “reservations, 
understandings, or declarations during the ratification process.”116 
This is an argument against the presumption against preemption 
generally. The legislative process was also designed to protect state 
interests117 and does so—for example, by producing statutes that 
expressly preserve state law.118 Yet the presumption against 
preemption applies to legislation. In accepting constitutional 
procedure as the primary protection for state interests, the Court did 
not eliminate a judicial role in the preservation of federalism.119 The 
Court has supplemented with canons such as the presumption 
against preemption that ensure that preemption results from the 
constitutional process.120 The previously noted concern of the 
treatymakers for federalist interests means that two constitutional 
 
 115.  See Moore, supra note 99, at 1019 & n.335 (noting this argument as well as the 
response of its skeptics). 
 116.  RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES: TREATIES § 108 reporters’ note 2 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2015). 
 117.  E.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550–54 (1985). 
 118.  Id. at 553–54. 
 119.  See Young, supra note 1, at 262, 264 (asserting that Garcia was not “an abdication 
of any judicial enforcement of limits on national power” but “a shift from efforts to impose 
substantive limitations on national power to a focus on process”). Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
Philip P. Frickey & Elizabeth Garrett, LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF 
PUBLIC POLICY 938 (4th ed. 2007) (suggesting that the federalism-based clear statement rule 
from Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991), might be justified “on the ground that the 
Tenth Amendment was underenforced by the Supreme Court, which had rarely invalidated 
federal laws because they intruded into core state functions”). 
 120.  See, e.g., Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2088–90; Young, supra note 1, at 256, 265–69, 321–
23 (emphasizing “the critical importance of the ‘presumption against preemption’” where “the 
courts’ [current] role in protecting federalism . . . focus[es] on facilitating and enhancing the 
operation of the[] political and procedural checks on national authority”). On occasion, the 
Court has also recognized substantive limits on congressional powers. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of 
Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2585–91 (2012); id. at 2642–50 (joint dissent); id. 
at 2677 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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actors view federalism interests as significant in treatymaking.121 The 
presumption against preemption serves those interests. 
CONCLUSION 
While the draft Restatement (Fourth) suggests that the role of 
the presumption against preemption is unclear in treaty preemption, 
recent developments suggest that there is or should be greater 
clarity. In particular, Medellín indicates that the presumption does 
not apply to non-self-executing treaties—not because treaties 
preempt more readily than statutes, but because non-self-executing 
treaties cannot preempt state law at all. Bond provides support for 
the conclusion that the presumption applies to executed treaties. 
And there are significant arguments that the presumption should 
apply to self-executing treaties as well. As a result, the Restatement 
(Fourth) need not be so reluctant to embrace the presumption 





















 121.  See Hollis, supra note 91, at 1386, 1392–93 (noting how the executive’s treatment 
of federalism in treatymaking “offers evidence of treaty power limits from the power-holder’s 
perspective—limits to which the Court is likely to defer”). 
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